I Die with My Country

Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870

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University of Nebraska Press
Lincoln and London
lazy and disdainful of any kind of work. Apparently, they feel better in their male role.  
Rusch was not the only foreign observer who considered Paraguayan men lazy and thought that women did most of the work as a consequence of the war. Paraguayan men explained this by claiming that, with so few of them left, women necessarily took over them and for that reason did everything to coddle their menfolk. That this was the case seems rather doubtful. While we can never determine whether Paraguayan women in the late 1800s preferred to let the few men lay in hammocks or debate in the plaza, today’s Paraguayan women clearly do not, though they still do a large part of the work. Women perform much of the agricultural labor, still dominate the marketplace, and are still the ones who offer stability to the (often incomplete) Paraguayan family. All of these customs have a long presence in the country. The war and the subsequent demographic imbalance aggravated women’s disadvantages, though it did not create them. The war and the postwar years only made more visible the important role of women’s work, not just to foreign observers but also to Paraguayans themselves. The only conclusion that men could draw from this was that it was absolutely necessary for the well-being of the nation to improve female education at all social levels. Before the war even many upper-class women were illiterate, but those who could read and write actively promoted women’s education after the war. This was perhaps the conflict’s only significant and lasting positive consequence for women, and it helped change attitudes in the following generations. Today the gender gap in illiteracy rates is comparatively small in Paraguay, 7.8 percent for women versus 5.6 percent for men; in contrast, in Bolivia these rates stand at 20.6 and 7.9 percent respectively.

In the immediate postwar years, circumstances for women in Paraguay did not improve but worsened. The country became famous as “the land of women,” but this did not make it a “land for women.” Female social standing and political rights were neglected in Paraguay until quite recently. That the female contribution to the Epopeya Nacional was less appreciated than feared by Paraguayan men is evident from the traditional historiography, which prefers not to celebrate the women who plowed the fields as much as those who gave their husbands and sons for the cause. This traditional portrayal is harmless to gender hierarchies. It keeps women subordinate to men and thus avoids any direct challenge to the old patriarchy. It also provides a more attractive backdrop for the nationalism propagated by subsequent Paraguayan governments, especially the military dictatorships of the twentieth century.

4. Patriotic Mobilization in Brazil

The Zuavos and Other Black Companies

Shortly after allied troops crossed the Paraná River and invaded southern Paraguay (mid-April 1866), the Brazilian plenipotentiary to the allied governments, Francisco Otaviano de Almeida Rosa, exulted to the war minister: “A warm embrace [abraçô] for our triumphs. Long live the Brazilians, be they white, black, mulatto, or Indian [abôcalô]! What brave men!” Otaviano’s enthusiasm for the military feats of his mixed-race countrymen raises the question of the war’s effect on racial politics in this racially diverse society. Brazil was then the largest slave society in the Americas, with some 1.5 million black men and women in bondage. But at least 4.25 million Afro-Brazilians were free, and they accounted for two-fifths of the total population of just over 10 million. The significance of the war’s massive mobilization for these Afro-Brazilians remains a controversial, but relatively unstudied, topic. Certainly black men dominated the rank and file arrayed against Paraguay, though the republic’s propaganda that portrayed all Brazilian soldiers as slaves or “monkeys” exaggerated this feature in playing on racial stereotypes. For many, notably the popular historian of the 1980s, Júlio José Chiavenato, the large number of black men in the ranks is evidence of a deliberate genocidal policy, for commanders used these soldiers as cannon fodder, especially after the start of slave recruitment in late 1866. Others echo Otaviano and see the war as an experience that forged a common nationality in battle. But Eduardo Silva’s well-known biography of Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, better known as Dom Obá II (the name that he took in Rio de Janeiro in the 1880s), a black man who served in one of the all-black Zuavo companies raised in Bahia, reveals some of the complexity that the war experience assumed for black Brazilians. Deeply monarchist, Obá clung to his service to the emperor as evidence of his membership in the nation, yet he also published sophisticated critiques of the racial discrimination from which he and his fellow Afro-Brazilians suffered.

In 1865, however, the future Obá II was but a minor figure in the mobilization of black men in Bahia and Pernambuco. In the provincial capitals of Salvador and Recife, several all-black companies, known variously as Zuavos, Couraças, and Sapadores, were organized in 1865–67. Well over a thousand men headed to the battlefields sporting distinctive uniforms and
Patriotic Mobilization in Brazil, 1865–66

The outbreak of war sparked an unexpected surge of patriotism throughout Brazil. On Christmas Eve 1864 João Batista Calógeras, a civil servant in the capital, wrote of the “patriotic effervescence” that had reached “36 degrees.” “God help Brazil,” he added in a note of worry. “While much of this militant patriotism was,” as Richard Morse has suggested, “the perquisite of a Europeanized elite,” it reached more deeply into society than most historians have acknowledged, tapping into what Eduardo Silva has called an unrecognized vein of nationality. Thousands of men (and even a few women) volunteered to take up arms or otherwise serve their country while national and provincial governments were inundated with donations in cash and in kind for the war effort. The creation of black companies in Bahia and Pernambuco formed part of this massive patriotic mobilization.

To facilitate recruitment the Brazilian government created the Voluntários da Pátria (Volunteers of the Fatherland) in the first week of January 1865. The soldiers in this elite corps would receive a substantial enlistment bonus, higher salaries than the regulars, and land grants and preference in the civil service after the war. These terms were soon extended to national guardsmen called up for service, and fully 75 percent of the ninety-one thousand men enlisted (according to army figures) claimed the status and benefits of Voluntários (though only a small fraction of them ever received the promised benefits). Thousands signed up in 1865. A clerk in the Bahian treasury naively requested three months’ leave with pay to participate in the war against the “despot of Paraguay”; a public school teacher more sensibly sought an indefinite leave.

Medical students volunteered en masse to serve in army hospitals. Most of those who volunteered as individuals were members of the middle class with close ties to the state, and Calógeras wondered what would become of such men who had never handled rifles. Soon patronage networks began to produce “volunteers” as rural landowners mobilized their clientele and led their followers to provincial capitals, just as they marched them to polling booths on election day. A historian of Pernambuco has noted that most volunteers in that province enlisted in groups, often under a patron’s guidance. Those who collected such recruits expected to command them in the field. A National Guard major from Curralinho, João Evangelista de Castro Tanajura, offered land on his ranches and sugar estates to the families of the volunteers who would join him. He insisted, however, that these men would only march under his command, a request that the Bahian president (governor) denied. Dionísio Cerqueira, at the time a young lieutenant, records that Tanajura, his cousin, subsequently died of “cerebral fever, certainly caused by the bitter disappointment at seeing his battalion given to the command of another.” An officer and several soldiers from another such volunteer battalion deserted rather than serve under the officers whom the president assigned to their unit. However the Voluntários da Pátria had been recruited, all assumed that they were different from army recruits, and the first battalions embarked from Salvador amid great fanfare in March and April 1865.

Along with voluntary enlistments, donations for the war effort began in late 1864, when Brazil invaded Uruguay, and their number soared after news of the Paraguayan invasion of Mato Grosso reached the empire. Salary deductions by civil servants and army officers led the list of donations, but clerks in commercial houses also contributed part of their monthly pay. Wealthy merchants and planters offered sometimes substantial sums of money to the government; after a meeting with more than one hundred of Salvador’s merchants in August 1865, the Bahian president reported that he had received donations totaling 20,000 mil-réis (US$400,000) to help outfit Salvador’s battalions. The owner of a printing press offered to produce war-related proclamations and circulars for free, while railroad lines and shipping companies agreed to transport recruits at no charge to the government. Musical and dramatic societies put on benefit concerts and patriotic performances. Principals of private schools opened their doors to the children of volunteers.

Women also participated in the mobilization. Wives and mothers of men in the service sewed shirts for soldiers and later prepared linen bandages for field hospitals. Even elite women took up needle and thread. Calógeras,
ever critical, offered a “smidgen of comedy” to his son and described the ostentatious manner in which the “great ladies” of the capital stitched pillows for the wounded. To ensure maximum visibility they gathered around open windows between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. Elite women also joined in a more symbolic campaign led by the Viscountess of Tamandaré (the wife of the Brazilian fleet’s commander) who called on senhoras to contribute jewels to decorate a sword to be presented to the emperor. One Bahian woman offered “the best stone from the best bracelet” that she owned. Others volunteered to serve as nurses, while Jovita Alves Feitosa, a young woman from Piauí, became a minor celebrity for disguising her sex and enlisting in the Voluntários from that province (though authorities in Rio de Janeiro refused to let her go to the front).

Most of those who contributed to the war effort had some connection to the state. Merchants and civil servants might have been subject to sanctions had they failed to do so, and they saw their contributions as services that would later earn them reward. Thus, like the ladies of the court, they sought as much publicity as possible. The first Bahian to offer his services in 1864, at the outset of the crisis in Uruguay, was an honorary army major, a lieutenant colonel of one of Salvador’s National Guard battalions, and an employee of Salvador’s customs house. He explicitly requested that his offer be presented to the emperor and proclaimed his pride at being the first Bahian to step forward to stop the “vandalism” of the Uruguayans. These were “middle-class” patriots, respectable individuals, whose aspirations differed little from their counterparts in France or Germany.

Such patriotism contrasted with what many perceived as a disturbing deafness to the country’s call. From remote Monte Santo a National Guard commander complained to his superiors that the local populace “does not know what patriotism is and will only march if impressed,” the time-honored solution to the problem of filling the ranks. Indeed the first reaction of most provincial governments to the Paraguayan invasion was a forced recruitment drive. As news of the Voluntários’ creation reached provincial capitals, the dreaded reclutamento subsided but never disappeared entirely in 1865. In late 1866, when the defeat at Curupayty heralded a manpower crisis, impressment resumed in full force.

This mix of voluntarism and coercive recruitment led to no small confusion. Bahia’s commander of arms complained of the “anti-military manner in which the organizers of forces are proceeding” and of a “civilianism [paisanismo]” that threatened to exclude him, “head of the military class in this province,” even from the appointment of army officers (men subject to him) to posts in the Voluntários. Officers’ memoirs contain laments about the “incompetent citizens” who received commands in reward for raising units, which led to many unnecessary battlefield losses. All this confirms Gilberto Freyre’s observation that Brazilians rushed to defend their country “more in the spirit of the warrior than the professional soldier.”

Given the importance of patron-client ties in recruitment, however, it was essential to adopt this manner of mobilization. By March 1866 Bahia’s 10,189 soldiers had embarked as thirty-seven separate battalions or companies, ranging in size from 12 to 598 men; only 593 were recruits for existing units. Indeed the president was extremely reluctant to send remittas: “It looks bad [É farto],” he explained bluntly. Although reorganizations of the army in the field erased many of the distinctions between Voluntários and regulars, the key theme in the 1865–66 mobilization was its voluntarism. This was, on one level, a myth, for many—perhaps even most—of the Brazilians who served against Paraguay did so against their will, but such myths proved crucial to portraying the war in an acceptable manner. Moreover it had a significant basis in reality, as the very real voluntarism of 1865 that extended deeply into society shows. The example of the Zuavos, furthermore, raises questions about the origins and nature of that identification with the state and the nation.

Zuavos and Couraças: The Independence War’s Legacy

Why the Bahian government resolved to recruit Zuavo and Couraças companies in 1865 remains something of a mystery. To create separate black units flew in the face of longstanding military policy. The last segregated units in the Brazilian army (the black and mulatto militia battalions) had been abolished in 1831, when the National Guard was created to replace them. The remaining legal racial preferences in recruitment for the army rank and file (which barred the recruitment of black men) were lifted in 1837 as part of the military buildup of the conservative Regresso administration. After that the army maintained a formally color-blind policy regarding its personnel, one that carried to remarkable extremes: the standard service-record form contained no information on enlisted men’s phenotype, so the army normally could not provide this information to the police authorities charged with tracking down deserters.

The original proposal to create all-black companies came from outside of the army, like so much of the rest of the patriotic mobilization of 1865–66.
Quirino Antônio do Espírito Santo offered, on 26 January 1865, to organize “creole citizens” into a “respectable volunteer corps which, through its daring, courage, and love of homeland will recall, once again, the valorous combatants under the command of the celebrated Henrique Dias.” Quirino invoked the patriotism that he had felt during the Independence War (1822–23) and proclaimed, “impelled by a supernatural force, I come to offer myself to the government to fight for the honor, integrity, and sovereignty of the empire, which vile gauchos insanely seek to offend.”

The proposal gained quick approval, and on 1 February Quirino took up quarters in Fort Barbalho, where he began raising the company. Within days it had taken the name “Zuavos Baianos,” the president having approved a subscription to outfit the new recruits with the distinctive uniform of the French colonial troops of Algeria. No less than eleven Zuavo companies, numbering 638 men, along with one company of Couraças, 80 strong, sailed for Rio de Janeiro and the southern battlefields by March 1866. No satisfactory explanation is known to exist for the decision adopted on the name and uniform of these French colonial troops. By the 1860s the French Zouave fashion of baggy red pants, decorated vest, and small cap or fez (based on North African dress) had spread widely among armies as diverse as the Union and Confederate forces in the U.S. Civil War and the international papal troops. Marco Antônio Cunha argues that the heroic death of a Rio-born French Zouave during the storming of the Malakof Tower in the Crimea inspired the creation of Zuavos in Bahia a decade later, but this man—Eduardo de Villeneuve—was never invoked in the Bahian mobilization. Moreover Zuavos were only raised in Bahia, and the sole other all-black company created in 1865–66 (in Recife, Pernambuco) only took the name when it joined the Bahian Zuavos at the front.

In Bahia the rhetoric and personal networks surrounding the Zuavos’ creation drew on other thoroughly Brazilian traditions, some of which they shared with the larger mobilization in the country. As Quirino’s leadership suggests, veterans of the Independence War played a central role in the early mobilization. Bahia had seen the most significant fighting of the independence struggle in Brazil—a year-long siege of Portuguese troops in Salvador (mid-1822 to mid-1823)—an episode that had profoundly marked Bahian society. In the 1860s the province witnessed an upsurge of interest in this heroic episode. The youngest veterans of this struggle were approaching sixty years of age, and in 1862 they founded the Sociedade Veteranos da Independência (Independence Veterans’ Society), a mutual-aid organization that undertook to promote the commemoration of independence heroes by celebrating annual masses for them. The society played a significant role in the annual celebrations of Dous de Julho (2 July), the date on which Portuguese troops evacuated Salvador. It raised independence veterans’ status in Salvador society, and its members figured prominently in many aspects of the Paraguayan War mobilization. Elderly veterans formed honor guards to send off Bahia’s troops in 1865 and 1866; late in the war the society raised funds for the eagerly anticipated victory celebrations.

Numerous leaders of Bahia’s early mobilization had fought in the Independence War. When Quirino embarked as a lieutenant commanding the First Zuavo Company, his commander was Lt. Col. José da Rocha Galvão, another independence veteran. So was José Eloi Buri, captain of the Couraças. Indeed the Couraças, raised between August and November 1865, recalled the leather-clad cowboys of the interior who had joined the patriots in the independence struggle. To this list we could add Lt. Col. Domingos Mundim Pestana, commander of the Third Voluntários Battalion, who had first joined the army in 1821 at the age of fifteen, as had Col. Joaquim Antônio da Silva Carvalhal, the driving force behind the society and the key figure in the Zuavos’ organization (whose role is examined below). The commanders of Bahia’s police (quickly converted into a Voluntários unit) and the local infantry (the Batalhão de Caçaçores da Bahia) were also independence veterans.

Independence service provided these men with contacts and connections that proved useful. During their brief stay in Rio de Janeiro en route to
the south, Rocha Galvão and Quirino received a courtesy call from Antônio Pereira Rebouças, the mulatto statesman who, along with Rocha Galvão and his brothers, had led the defense of Cachoeira against Portuguese attack in 1822.37 Few of the elderly veterans lasted long at the front. Quirino died in November at Montevideo, and in February 1866 a sick Pestana was back in Salvador, where he died two years later. Others soldiered on. Rocha Galvão perished during the battle of Tuyutí, while Buri passed away shortly after being invalided out in late 1867.38 As long as they could serve, however, age ensured these men respect, at least judging by a description of Quirino during a brief stop in Desterro (today Florianópolis), Santa Catarina: “an old black, a truly good man, whom his soldiers respect as a father.”39

Not only did the Zuavo and Couraças leadership hark back to the independence struggle, but their mobilization also recalled an older tradition, that of the black militia abolished in 1831. Quirino’s proclamation invoked Henrique Dias, a black man who had led a troop of free blacks during the seventeenth-century struggle against the Dutch in Pernambuco. After this war his men had been converted into a militia unit. Such regiments, dubbed “Henriques” in honor of their first commander, proliferated in the eighteenth century and constituted a key linkage between Afro-Brazilians and the colonial state; their officer corps formed a black elite. In Bahia the Henriques distinguished themselves during the independence struggle, but liberal reformers in the 1820s undermined their status in the armed forces. With the creation of the National Guard in 1831, the government abolished the black militia. Its officers and soldiers played a large role in the 1837–38 Sabinada Rebellion, which restored their status, but many of their leaders were killed in the massacre of rebels that followed the defeat.40

In Pernambuco a provincial patriotism that looked to the seventeenth-century expulsion of the Dutch as the province’s foundational moment kept the Henriques’ memory alive.41 By contrast the Henriques seem to have been wholly absent from Bahian discourse between 1838 and 1864. Nevertheless the creation of the Zuavo companies prompted an outpouring of patriotic rhetoric that recalled the black heroes of the independence struggle. Carvalhal sent off the Second Zuavo Company with a rousing speech that called on the men to “fight bravely against the Paraguayans just as the intrepid and immortal Henrique Dias fought in the past against the Dutch, and as in the glorious epoch of independence, the courageous Lieutenant-Colonel Manoel Gonçalves [da Silva] led those of your color in valor and bravery.”42

Bit of bloodthirsty doggerel, the “Hino dos Zuavos Baianos” (Hymn of the Bahian Zuavos), whose first verse and chorus ran:

Sou crioulo da guerra na crisma
Por Zuavo o meu nome troquei
Tenho sede de sangue inimigo
Por bebê-o o meu sangue darei

D’Henrique Dias
Neto esforçado
Vôo ao teu brado
Patria gentil!
Mais que o da França
Ligeiro e bravo
Seja o Zuavo
Cá do Brasil

I am a Creole: christened in war
I changed my name to Zuavo
I am thirsty for enemy blood
To drink it, I will shed my own

Of Henrique Dias
Valiant grandson
I hasten in response to your call
Noble homeland!
More than those of France
Light and brave
Be the Zuavo
Here from Brazil

Subsequent verses recalled Gonçalves’s distinguished service during the Independence War and warned Paraguayans and Blancos to fear the Zuavos’ wrath.

This was not just symbolic rhetoric. Several direct connections can be drawn between the Zuavos of 1865 and Salvador’s pre-1831 Henriques. For a brief period in February and March 1865 Capt. Joaquim José de Santana Gomes held a commission to raise the Second Zuavo Company; until 1831 he had been adjutant of the Henriques.43 Among those who marched with the First Zuavos was First Cadet Constantino Luiz Xavier Bigode, son of the black battalion’s last commander.44 Although no troop registers from the black regiment have survived to confirm this, it is quite likely that some of the Zuavo officers had served in the Henriques’ enlisted ranks in the
1820s. Similarly the organizer and commander of the black company raised in Recife, Felipe José da Exaltação Maniva, had enlisted in the black militia there in 1817 and was promoted to second lieutenant in 1821.46

Little information has come to light on the civilian occupations of the Zuavo officers. According to the Count of Eu, the heir apparent's consort, many had been sergeants in the National Guard, which suggests that they enjoyed at least a modest degree of economic success and social standing. Both Buri and his second in command in the Couraças, João Capistrano Fernandes, had been lieutenants in the guard before 1850. Officer ranks in that corporation then required a minimum annual income of 400 mil-réis (US$250), while rank-and-file members needed to demonstrate half that income.47 There are at least three passing references to black officers' occupations: Maniva was a carpenter; Bigode a cabinetmaker; and Capistrano a typographer. Capt. André Fernandes Galiza owned a small farm (fazenda) on the outskirts of Salvador.48 In short, this evidence suggests that the Zuavo and Couraças officers came from the ranks of the skilled-artisan class, a profile quite similar to that of the Henrique officers before 1831.49 In this respect the Zuavo leaders were of more modest social origins than the civil servants and professionals who rushed to the colors in 1865 and dominated the Voluntários da Pátria officer corps.

The rhetoric surrounding the mobilization of the Zuavos, as well as the background of key individuals involved in their organization, suggests that they embodied a vibrant tradition of patriotic service to the state on the part of Afro-Bahians. Elderly veterans led much of the early mobilization and saw themselves as successors to the black heroes of past struggles against foreign invaders. That such men should have enthusiastically taken up arms in 1865 is not surprising, for they (or their fathers) had done so four decades earlier. The younger ones had likely grown up hearing about the black heroes of earlier wars.

**Recruiting for the Black Companies: Race, Politics, and Patronage**

Not surprisingly, less information is available on the Zuavos' rank and file than on their officers. What exists suggests that they consisted of a mix of more or less willing volunteers and unwilling draftees, which would make them typical of Brazil's recruitment in 1865. Quirino proudly declared that the First Zuavos consisted only of "spontaneous volunteers," but this declaration was prompted by the refusal of one of these "volunteers" to swear his oath to the flag.50 The classic example of volunteering comes from outside of Salvador: Cândido da Fonseca Galvão (the future Dom Óbê II), a freedman from Lençóis, brought thirty volunteers to the capital, where they were promptly enlisted in the Third Zuavos, with Galvão named second lieutenant.51

Considerable prestige accrued to those who, like Galvão, could collect volunteers. Andrê Fernandes Galiza complained that his commission to raise the Third Zuavos had suffered by the simultaneous appointment of João Francisco Barbosa de Oliveira to raise a competing company. Barbosa enjoyed more success than Galiza, embarking in command of forty-eight men in what became the Third Zuavo Company (though most of them were Galvão's recruits), while Galiza's Fourth Zuavos set sail shortly thereafter with only twelve men (but with a full stock of eighty uniforms).52 Joining a unit was rarely an individual decision, and volunteers typically presented themselves in groups, often under the auspices of a patron. The role of prominent individuals in organizing the Zuavos and the Couraças, particularly Carvalhal but also Abilio Cesar Borges, the educator and future Baron of Macaúbas, suggests such patronage networks. (Borges acquired eighty Minié rifles for the Fifth Zuavos, whose organization he oversaw.)53 Other recruits apparently succumbed to peer pressure: in November a Zuavo volunteer regretted his decision to enlist, claiming to have been tricked into doing so by some friends during a party.54

Enlisting in the Zuavos differed from signing up for other units, for it meant joining a black company. Presumably Quirino's "spontaneous volunteers" shared a racial identity that led them to join that service rather than one of the several other battalions then being organized. Some designated guardsmen also requested to serve in a Zuavo company in August 1865, which may indicate similar views. Authorities apparently worked to maintain the racial profile of Zuavo units. The commander of arms normally selected crioulo (Creole) recruits from among the volunteer contingents that arrived from the interior and once excluded a man from the Zuavos "for being of brown [parda] color."55

Indications of forced recruitment for the Zuavos increased in frequency in the middle of 1865. In August O Alabama recommended the discharge of one Verissimo, who suffered from insanity and disturbed the peace with his shouts as he fled the barracks to escape military duties. Later that month the same newspaper reported that the companies then being organized had lists of national guardsmen destined for conscription into their ranks. The chief of police sent another guardsman to the Zuavos as a new recruit after arresting him in an illegal gambling house. On 26 August Zuavo soldiers sought to
impress Simão, a mulato slave, who eluded his pursuers by diving into the sea, where he drowned.  

Two other instances of slave recruitment suggest solidarity between the Zuavos and the slaves, who apparently joined willingly. A young slave, João, sent out to purchase banana leaves, turned up two hours later outfitted as a Zuavo, ready to serve his country rather than his annointed master, who began proceedings to reclaim him. When the owner of another slave, João Gualberto da Silva, sought to reclaim his property, he was insulted by the Zuavos; returning the next day, he found his slave already enlisted, which meant that he would have to file a more detailed claim for the man’s return. Moreover João Gualberto had been conditionally freed, which weakened the owner’s case. The president ordered him to provide further documentation, and a month later João Gualberto was still in prison. In both of these cases it is likely that the slaves were complicit in their recruitment and that the Zuavos willingly helped these men in their efforts to escape bondage. After this flurry of complaints about Zuavo impressment, most of which resulted from excesses on the part of one officer, their recruitment practices ceased to provoke complaints.

A few other sources suggest that the Zuavo rank and file were both a disorderly lot and thoroughly integrated into Salvador’s urban popular culture and street life. O Alabama complained in early June 1865 that the Zuavos doing guard duty outside their quarters spent their nights “provoking disturbances, cavorting with black women, and setting off fireworks” at passersby. Street children joined in the soldiers’ diversions, earning the nickname “zuaveinhos.” The fireworks suggest that the men were celebrating St. John’s Day (24 June) a bit early.

The degree to which Brazil’s mobilization followed partisan political lines—Liberal versus Conservative—has received little attention, yet partisan considerations shaped recruitment in wartime as much as they did in peacetime. Liberals controlled government and administration from 1862 until 1868, and Conservatives regularly denounced their rivals’ excesses. In one such case the Jornal do Comércio’s Conservative correspondent bitterly condemned Marcolino José Dias’s appointment to command the Second Zuavos, describing him as a freedman who “has done nothing to elevate himself.” The journalist claimed that Marcolino earned his living as a police spy and had received his commission as a National Guard sergeant “for the terror that, during the [last] election, his head-butts [cabeçadas] instilled in everyone.” Shortly before his Zuavo appointment, Marcolino led a “bunch of thugs” who gathered in the visitors’ gallery of the provincial legislature to intimidate the sole Conservative deputy.

The sergeant’s skill at cabeçadas, one of the characteristic moves of capoeira, the Afro-Brazilian martial art, tied party politics to the rough-and-tumble, largely Afro-Brazilian, world of the street. While capoeira gangs were a constant and often lamented feature of life in Rio de Janeiro during the nineteenth century, there are almost no contemporary references to this martial art in Salvador. In the Brazilian capital capoeiristas faced police repression but sometimes incorporated themselves into political networks (as did Marcolino). Manoel Raimundo Querino, the chronicler of Afro-Bahian history, wrote in the early twentieth century that the Bahian government packed many capoeiristas off to the front, where they proved themselves valuable in hand-to-hand combat, such as during the storming of the Curuzú fortifications in September 1866. While there are no specific references to the impressment of capoeira practitioners in Bahia during the war, Marcolino in fact distinguished himself at Curuzú (see below).

Regardless of the truth of any accusations against Marcolino, they clearly show his partisan ties. Others viewed him favorably; back in Salvador on leave in 1867, he was apparently a highly popular figure: “Wherever he goes, he is accompanied by a multitude of the people,” reported O Alabama. The 1868 change in government (prompted by a ministerial crisis over the war’s conduct) rendered Marcolino’s position considerably more difficult. In September he narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of unknown assailants. The Jornal do Comércio’s Liberal correspondent doubted that the police would find the culprit, for the intended victim “was one of those who has taken the most active part in elections for his party. The rulers [of this province] have long sworn to teach him a masterful lesson.”

As long as they were out of power, Conservatives could do little more than rail against what they perceived as inappropriate appointments during the patriotic mobilization of 1865–66. Liberals ensured that the Zuavos enjoyed a high profile in Bahian society. During the 1865 Dois de Julho celebrations, dapperly dressed Zuavos stood on guard at the decorative stage that was the centerpiece of this civic ceremony. The Liberal Bahia Ilustrada opened its front pages to Zuavo and Couraçaos officers, four of whose portraits joined those of the other Bahian patriots that the newspaper featured in 1867–68. While they were being organized in Salvador, the Zuavo companies were always included in the celebrations of Brazil’s early victories, including the fall of Montevideo and the battle of the Riachuelo.
The central figure in the organization of the Zuavo companies was Colonel Carvalhal, who personally embodied many of the networks already analyzed. He was a retired National Guard superior commander and long-time customs official who had served as a cadet during the Independence War. He enjoyed considerable prestige among those recruited for the Zuavos, overseeing the training of several companies and looking after dependents. He allowed Sgt. Inocêncio da Costa Lima’s family to live in one of his own houses (which he was later reported as planning to give to the family after Inocêncio’s death at Tuyutí), and he acted as tutor for Marcolino José Dias’s son; in 1869 he looked after the funeral of Captain Barbosa’s son. Marcolino and Inocêncio publicly thanked Carvalhal for his assistance to them. The colonel presented Buri and Capistrano’s proposal for the Couraças company to the provincial president. He witnessed the marriage of one Couraças volunteer on the eve of the soldier’s embarkation and wrote in support of his wife, who a year later had not received a promised salary consignment. Bahia Ilustrada asserted that he personally arranged the enlistment of many more soldiers.

The source of Carvalhal’s influence among these nonwhite officers and soldiers is not clear, but many had served under him in the National Guard. He was a Liberal Party stalwart, and O Alabama proposed him as the “popular candidate” for city council in the 1868 elections, swept by the Conservatives who then controlled the electoral machinery. His ties to Captain Marcolino underscore this Liberal connection. Moreover, as a leader in the Sociedade Veteranos da Independência, Carvalhal had connections to many of the veteran commanders of Bahia’s units. And he had links to Afro-Bahian organizations. In 1859 he served as “protector” (sêrèe protecter) of the Sociedade Protetora dos Desvalidos (Society for the Protection of the Needy), a black mutual-aid society; a number of other men involved in raising the Zuavos sat on this society’s board. A decade later he figured among the founders of an abolitionist society that met in his spacious house. In 1870 Carvalhal drew a direct connection between the Zuavos and abolitionism when he gave Captain Barbosa the honor of presenting the letter of liberty to a slave child on 7 September (Brazil’s independence day).

But Carvalhal also had his share of enemies. His independence from the regular chain of command rankled military authorities. In January 1865 the garrison’s commander censured him for addressing dispatches directly to the provincial president instead of through the military hierarchy. Sometime in 1866, after the last Zuavos had embarked, Carvalhal offered to organize companies or even a battalion of African and Creole freedmen, adding that he wanted to do so as a direct agent of the president, not as a subordinate to the commander of arms, who might subject him to “unreasonable admonitions.” The president denied this request, but in early 1867 Carvalhal organized the Sapador companies, which consisted mostly of former slaves whose freedom the government had obtained by compensating their owners. The commander of arms complained that Carvalhal had exceeded his authority by issuing promotions, granting leaves, and naming cadets, all without consulting him. In this way the recently freed sappers received training “better for ruining them than for turning them into good soldiers.” Perhaps most remarkably, even at this late date, the networks over which Carvalhal presided could generate volunteers. Francisco Antônio de Carvalhal Menezes e Vasconcelos, a former army cadet dishonorably discharged in 1856 and who returned to the colors to serve as sergeant in the First Sapador Company (and possibly a relative of Carvalhal), presented twenty-one volunteers to the unit.

Despite Carvalhal’s ability to organize companies and find volunteers, the president refused to place him in charge of province-wide recruitment in late 1867, a task that he had offered to undertake without pay. For a month Bahia Ilustrada railed against this decision, praising Carvalhal and accusing the man appointed instead of cowardice for having turned his back on the Paraguayans and of incompetence for having earlier been removed from the post of inspector of the army arsenal. Other newspapers joined in this clamor, but Carvalhal failed to obtain this commission, which carried a handsome monthly stipend of 300 mil-réis (US$13.8).

The organization of the Sapador companies in early 1867 (along with Maniva’s appointment to raise an “Henrique Dias” company in Recife in the middle of that year) were the last attempts to recruit racially distinct units for service in the Paraguayan War. By this time the country needed recruits for its existing battalions, not more independently organized companies. An increasingly desperate government undertook even more coercive impressment, ordered levies of designated national guardsmen, and resorted to the purchase of slaves to be freed and enlisted. By this time too the Zuavos had long ceased to exist as separate units in the forces arrayed against Paraguay.

Zuavos at the Front

It is not easy to follow the Zuavos after their departure from Salvador. The companies, attached to Bahia’s Voluntários da Pátria battalions, left Bahia separately, usually stopping at Rio de Janeiro en route to the south. In the
capital they sometimes underwent reorganizations; Marcolino José Dias, for example, received his promotion to captain there. The first Zuavos to pass through Rio de Janeiro caused something of a stir, at least judging by Semana Ilustrada’s cartoon suggesting that black men in the capital were eager to emulate the Bahians’ patriotic example. Stopping briefly in Desterro, Santa Catarina, the First Zuavos stood out for their “robust physique and discipline.” At some point the First and Second Zuavos were joined, and both were rushed upriver from Montevideo in August. They distinguished themselves on the improvised flotilla that disrupted communication between the two Paraguayan columns advancing on opposite sides of the Uruguay River. After the Allied victory at the battle of Yatay (17 August) put an end to the enemy column on the river’s right bank, the Zuavos headed for Uruguaiana, arriving in time for the Paraguayan surrender on 18 September. There the Count of Eu judged them to be “the most handsome troop... of the whole army.” He was particularly impressed by their officers, who were attentive to their duties and “proud of their battalion [sic].”

During the next months the First and Second Zuavos spent some time attached to the navy; Quirino fell ill and passed away in a Montevideo hospital. On 1 December 1863 the Baron of Porto Alegre (Manoel Marques de Souza) organized the four-company Provisional Zuavo Corps at São Borja as part of the Brazilian army’s II Corps. It consisted of the First, Second, and Third Companies from Bahia and Manuva’s black company from Pernambuco, which until then had not taken the Zuavo name (soldiers and officers from the tiny Fourth Zuavo Company probably joined them at this time). Captain Marcolino received temporary command of the Zuavo Corps, but Porto Alegre replaced him on 1 January 1866 with a regular-army captain granted a brevet commission as major. Both the death of the respected Quirino and the reorganization of the Zuavo companies prompted, according to Francisco Otaviano, the Brazilian plenipotentiary, “some disturbance in the Zuavo Battalion [sic], and from São Borja, I am receiving constant complaints.” One of the bearers of these complaints was 2d Lt. Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, then in Buenos Aires to beg the minister to intercede on his behalf. He had faced two courts-martial, unjustly, according to the minister, and sought reincorporation into the army. There are indications of other abrupt personnel changes in the Provisional Zuavo Corps at this time, but despite these difficulties it remained with Porto Alegre’s II Corps.

A second contingent of Zuavos, consisting of some of the later and generally smaller companies from Bahia, was gradually organized in the I Corps under Manoel Luiz Osório (the future Marquis of Herval). On the eve of the invasion of Paraguay he assigned them to the health service, where they worked in hospitals at the rear. Salvador’s O Alabama lamented that these men, “worthy of a better fate, were reduced to hospital janitors and other such occupations.” Like other Brazilian commanders, Osório had little use for small independent units at a time when it was crucial to maintain battalions at full strength. Back in January he had dissolved the Couraças almost as soon as they arrived at his camp at Laguna Brava, assigning the soldiers and officers to other units. This was likely also the fate of the last Zuavo companies raised in Bahia, which embarked in early 1866. Turning the Zuavos into janitors, however, smacked of traditional slavocrat attitudes about menial service as an appropriate role for black men. Cerqueira, a Bahian, later lamented that Osório had failed to take advantage of the Henrique Dias tradition of separate black units.

Meanwhile the Provisional Zuavo Corps remained with Porto Alegre’s II Corps in Corrientes; this force finally crossed into Paraguay on 1 September 1866 to move against Paraguayan fortifications in conjunction with the fleet. On 23 August Porto Alegre had ordered the Zuavo Corps dissolved and its
personnel distributed among the rest of his II Corps; by this time it may have received reinforcements from some of the other Zuavo companies. There may not have been time to implement Porto Alegre’s order before the battle of Curuzú (2 September), in which the Bahians and Pernambucans led the charge against the Paraguayan trenches and ramparts. Sixty-six-year-old Pernambucan captain Maniva was one of the first into the enemy trenches, while Captain Marcolino was reportedly the first to scale the enemy earthworks, scrambling up on the back of one of his soldiers. There he engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle over the Paraguayan flag, knocking down the enemy standard, raising the green-and-yellow Brazilian flag, and according to Manoel Querino announcing, “Here is the black Bahian Zuavo!” His capeia skills must have come in handy. At least four other Zuavo officers received recognition for valor during this battle. Cândido López, the artist who arrived at Curuzú with Argentine reinforcements a few days afterward, later recalled the Zuavos and their “showy uniforms,” including them in his 1891 painting of the camp.

By the end of September the Zuavo Corps was definitively disbanded, part of the constant reorganizations necessitated by massive losses due to disease and combat, particularly the Curupayty defeat (22 September), in which four Zuavo officers fell wounded (one fatally); one more was decorated for bravery in that battle. The distinctive uniforms noted by the Argentine painter gave way to standard military dress—there are, in fact, no contemporary portraits of Zuavos in the peculiar attire of 1865. As the conflict wore on, many Zuavo officers joined the long lists of casualties that accumulated from the grinding trench warfare around Humaitá and in the unhealthy Allied camps. Others, like Captains Marcolino and Maniva, were invalided out. Few made it through the war. Captain Barbosa, commander of the Third Zuavos, managed to serve for the entire conflict but failed to receive a promotion. Wounded twice, he never took leave, as he proudly explained in a postwar petition; he was among the troops that finally caught up with Francisco Solano López at Cerro Corá (Aquidabán). Cadet Bigode fell into Paraguayan hands shortly after the battle of Curupayty and spent more than two years as a prisoner of war, working at the Ybycuí foundry. Liberated in 1869, he returned to his post, earning a promotion to second lieutenant in March 1870.

In 1870 three Bahian Voluntários da Pátria battalions returned to their home province. They were received with great fanfare, after which authorities quickly disarmed and disbanded them. Many of the soldiers mustered out without receiving the salaries still owed to them. Few Zuavo officers or men were, however, among the veterans who returned home that year. Carvalhal prepared an elaborate wreath to welcome back Captain Barbosa, the only Zuavo officer noted in the surviving press coverage of these celebrations. A nostalgic poem addressed to Carvalhal lamented the passing of “our old friends” Rocha Galvão, Buri, and Quirino, the independence veterans who had served as examples for Bahia’s youth and then gave way to the next generation.

No doubt Zuavos found the return to civilian life difficult, as did other veterans, whether they returned home in 1870 or earlier. Bigode, rewarded for his services with an unpaid honorary commission as army second lieutenant, unsuccessfully sought a pension in 1875, claiming that he could not support his family because of war injuries. Like Bigode, Marcolino remained in Salvador; according to a later memorialist, he found himself reduced to working as a street sweeper until he received a sinecure as doorman at the public library. Until his death in 1888, Captain Marcolino was a well-known figure in Salvador, heavily involved in local patriotic activities, regularly leading celebrants on the Dois de Julho holiday. He also served on the Sociedade Protetora dos Desvalidos board in 1886. Others joined Galvão in the emigration from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro traced by Eduardo Silva. Like the newly named Dom Obá II, Maniva, Barbosa, and another Bahian Zuavo lieutenant spent time in the capital’s Asilo dos Inválidos da Pátria (the old soldiers’ home); their petition files in the army archive reveal that they doggedly pursued further rewards, pensions, and promotions in compensation for their wartime service, of course underscoring their patriotism and service to the pâtria. Obá went further and created a record of military service for himself, which contemporaries gradually came to accept, though he failed to present any documentation to corroborate his claims.

Unfortunately none of these men left any documentation affording insights into their postwar political views in the way that Obá left through a series of newspaper articles. Like the majority of Brazil’s veterans, they melted into the free poor population from which they had been recruited. In Salvador’s black community, memories of the Zuavos endured. In the early twentieth century Manoel Querino recorded their names and military feats, drawing on oral tradition. By this time there was no place for black soldiers in the public imagery of a republican regime that looked to Europe as its model. Even the late empire offered little to its black defenders, as Eduardo Silva makes clear in his biography of Galvão (Obá II). To be sure, Emperor
Pedro II regularly received the Prince of the People at court, but when the monarchy seemed to take a populist turn in the aftermath of abolition, it was overthrown. Black soldiers may have returned home with a “new spirit” and a “much greater ability to analyze Brazil’s slave society,” as Nelson Werneck Sodré has argued, but the empire (and much less so the republic) offered them little and provided them with few avenues for membership in the nation for which they had fought and died. Ultimately, as Miguel Angel Centeno has observed for Latin America more generally, “a too active or fervent sense of nationhood,” such as that expressed by the Zuavos in 1865, “could actually backfire and create conditions mimetical to elite domination.” Brazil needed such patriots in 1865, but after the war the country’s narrow political culture offered few opportunities for black men like the Zuavos to make their demands known, much less exercise full citizenship.

5. Benjamin Constant

The “Truth” behind the Paraguayan War

The Paraguayan War was still raging when pundits identified Benjamin Constant as the author of an article on the conflict published anonymously in a Rio de Janeiro paper. In a letter to the newspaper’s editor the recently returned veteran denied authorship but instead offered to publish under his own name “the truth that I know of what has taken place in the current war with Paraguay.” There is no indication of this promised article in his private archive, but his correspondence during the time that he was at the front certainly contains elements of the “truth” that he would have told about the war.

Born in 1837, Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães reached the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Brazilian army. A professor of mathematics in military and civilian schools and one of the most important advocates of positivism in Brazil, he acted as the principal organizer of the military coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1889. In the subsequent provisional government (1889–91) he served as second vice president, war minister, and head of the Ministry of Education, Post, and Telegraph. After his premature death in January 1891, the republic’s constituent assembly bestowed on him the title “Founder of the Republic.”

During his eleven months in Paraguay (October 1866–September 1867) Benjamin Constant corresponded with several people, including his wife, his father-in-law, his brother, and several close friends. The approximately sixty extant letters are but a fraction of this correspondence. Several have been lost, and most of those that he received during this time have not come to light. These losses do not, however, diminish the value of the surviving letters. That they were not written for publication distinguishes them from the wartime correspondence previously available to researchers—official dispatches and isolated letters. It also distinguishes them from the classic war memoirs written for posterity in different political contexts. These letters resemble the sources used by Bell I. Wiley in his classic studies of the U.S. Civil War based on the private correspondence of Confederate and Union soldiers.

Benjamin Constant’s correspondence can also be read as a counterpoint to the war narratives that repeat the official government or army view. Explicit criticisms of military and civil authorities occasionally appear in his writings, especially when he and his friends question official reports. The letters thus
I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research funding. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society for Military History Conference, University of Calgary, May 2001; and at the Conference on War and Citizenship, University of Texas at Austin, April 2003. I thank Thomas L. Whigham for his comments on earlier drafts and José Celso de Castro Alves for assistance at a key point in the research. The Jornal do Commercio was published in Rio de Janeiro, while O Alabama and Bahia Ilustrada appeared in Salvador.

1. Francisco Otaviano de Almeida Rosa to José Antônio Saraiva, Buenos Aires, 24 Apr. 1866, in Otaviano, Cartas, 159.
3. Chiavenato, Voluntários da Pátria; Chiavenato, Negro no Brasil.
4. Cunha, Chama, 63, 139, 143.
5. Silva, Prince of the People.
8. Decreto 3371, 7 Jan. 1865; Decreto 3508, 30 Aug. 1865, Brazil, Minister of Justice, Coleções das Leis do Brasil (1865); “Mappa da força . . .” Brazil, Minister of War, Relatório (1872); Beattie, Tribute of Blood, 173-74.
9. Petitions de José Jorge Bisucheth and José Jorge Perruchot to president of Bahia, [Salvador], c. 1865, APEBA/SC, m. 3670; president to minister of war, Salvador, 4 Aug. 1865, ANRT/SPE/167, m. 125, fol. 247; J. B. Calógeras to P. G. Calógeras, Rio de Janeiro, 12 Jan. 1865, in Calógeras, Ministro, 197.

11. João Evangelista de Castro Tanajura to president, Curralinho, 2 Feb. 1865; and Salvador, 21 Apr. 1865, APERA/SACP, m. 3669; Cerqueira, Reminiscências; 56; lieutenant colonel commanding, Second Battalion, Voluntários da Pátria, to commander of arms, Salvador, 16 May 1865 (copy), APERA/SACP, m. 3444; O Alabama, 25 May 1865.

12. On these offers see “Registro de Donativos,” APERA/SACP, m. 3675–1, fols. 866–1461. The meeting with merchants is reported in president to minister of war, Salvador, 24 Oct. 1865, ANR/S/P/1G1, m. 115, fols. 1276–77. Numerous other such donations to the war effort can be found in APERA/SACP, m. 3669; and “Relação dos donativos feitos ao Estado para as despesas da guerra, bem como para acquisição de Voluntários da Pátria . . .” 20 Apr. 1866, appendix to Brazil, Minister of War, Relatório (1866). Such donations have been analyzed by Silvio Bocamartins, A Bahia na Guerra do Paraguai, Revista do Instituto Geográfico e Histórico da Bahia 72 (1945), 141–88; Salles, Guerra do Paraguai, 98–105; and Marcelo Santos Rodrigues, “Os (in)voluntários da Pátria na Guerra do Paraguai (a participação da Bahia no conflito)” (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2001), 55–56. Much the same story can be told for other provinces. See Carneiro, Panamá, 119–25; Zildarte Inácio de Oliveira Martins, A participação de Goiás na Guerra do Paraguai (Goiânia: UFU Editora, 1983), 75–73; Lucena Filho, “Pernambuco,” 89–91; and Adauto M. R. da Câmera, O Rio Grande do Norte na Guerra do Paraguai (Natal: Tipografia Galhardo, 1951), 24–27.


14. Feliciana Maria de Brito Lopes Alves to president, Salvador, 31 Oct. 1865, APERA/SACP, m. 3669.


16. Gustavo Adolfo de Menezes to commander of arms, Salvador, 3 May 1865, ANR/S/P/1G1, m. 115, fols. 301–2.

17. Felisberto José Pinho to president, Monte Santo, 6 May 1865, APERA/SACP, m. 3669.

18. For Salvador this trajectory can easily be traced in the January 1865 issues of O Alabama. For another province see Câmera, Rio Grande do Norte, 21.


20. Bahia, President, Relatório (1866), 16–17.


22. On this point see also Salles, Guerra do Paraguai, 61, 63.


24. Only 17.1 percent of 936 desertion notices dating from 1830 to 1887 contained information on the soldier’s race. See the Bahian commander of arms’s correspondence in APERA/SACP, RNB/SM.


26. On the subscriptions see letter from Bahia, 5 Feb. 1865, in Jornal do Commercio, 10 Feb. 1865; letter from Bahia, 14 Feb. 1865, in Jornal do Commercio, 21 Feb. 1865 (supplement); and Pedro Francelino to president, Salvador, 6 Apr. 1865, APERA/SACP, m. 3137.

27. Bahia, President, Relatório (1866), 16–17; “Mappa demonstrativo do pessoal das Companhias de Zuavos, Couraças e Sapadores organizado pelo Coronel Comandante Superior Joaquim Antônio da Silva Carvalhal,” 13 Nov. 1871, APERA/SACP, m. 3075.


31. On independence in Bahia see Kraya, Race, State, and Armed Forces, chap. 5. Rodrigues also notes the importance of independence rhetoric in Bahia’s mobilization. “(In)voluntários,” 18, 43, 51.


34. On the Couraças’ creation see O Alabama, 3, 12 Aug., 4 Nov. 1865.


36. Respectively, Joaquim Maurício Ferreira and José Baltazar da Silveira. On these men as independence veterans, see Jornal do Commercio, 7 Jan. 1865; and Kraya, Race, State, and Armed Forces, 121, 174.
37. André Pinto Rebouças, Diário e notas autobiográficas: Teatro escolhido e anotações, ed. Ana Flora e Inácio José Verissimo (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1938), 65 (31 Mar. 1863).
38. O Alabama, 1 Mar. 1866, 7 May 1868, 14 June 1866; files on Quiroga and José Eloy Bury, ABNF.
42. "Despedida do organizador da 2.a Companhia de Zuvao Baianos, Joaquim Antonio da Silva Carvalhal," 1 May 1865, ABNF/M, II-11-34, 5-47.
46. Petition of Felippe José da Exalação Maniva to emperor, Rio de Janeiro, 7 June 1874, ABNE/RG, 1-18-672.
49. Kraay, Race, State, and Armed Forces, 91.
50. Quirino to commander of arms, Salvador, 24 Feb. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 6463.
51. Silva, Prince of the People, 22-23.
52. Petition of André Fernandes Galliza to president, c. June 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3438; commander of arms to president, Salvador, 21 Aug. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3454.
54. Commander of arms to president, Salvador, 2 Nov. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3444.
55. Commander of arms to president, Salvador, 10 Aug. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3438; 26 July 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3448; 24 Oct. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3411.
56. O Alabama, 1, 22, and 31 Aug. 1865; João Francisco Barbosa de Oliveira to commander of arms, Salvador, 3 June 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3444; commander of arms to chief of police, 11 Sept. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 6463; O Alabama, 11 Sept. 1865.
57. These cases can be followed in petition of Florencio da Silva e Oliveira to president, c. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3666; O Alabama, 2, 4 Sept., 4 Oct. 1865; acting commander of arms to president, Salvador, 9 Sept. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3432. On reclaiming fugitive slaves from the army; see Hendrik Kraay, "The Shelter of the Uniform: The Brazilian Army and Runaway Slaves, 1800-1888," Journal of Social History 20, no. 3 (spring 1996): 637-57.
58. O Alabama, 6 June 1865. In these respects the Zuavos differed little from other Brazilian soldiers. Kraay, Race, State, and Armed Forces, chaps. 3, 7; Beattie, Tribute of Blood, chap. 7.
60. Letters from Bahia, 26 Mar., 10 Apr. 1865, in Jornal do Commercio, 6, 15 Apr. 1865.
62. Querino, Bahia, 78-80.
65. Letter from Bahia, 5 July 1865, in Jornal do Commercio, 11 July 1865.
66. In addition to fig. 3, see Bahia Ilustrada, 11 July, 17 Sept. 1867.
69. Carvalhal to president, Salvador, 14 Mar. 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3454; petition of Carvalhal to president, [Salvador], c. 1866, APEBA/SACP, m. 1671; "Registro de donativos," APEBA/SACP, m. 1675-1, fol. 939-941; Bahia Ilustrada, 1 Dec. 1867; file on Innocenço da Costa Lima, ABNF/IAP; O Alabama, 17 July 1869; "Despedida," O Alabama, 4 May 1865; "Despedidas," Jornal do Commercio, 10 May 1865.
70. Carvalhal to president, Salvador, 31 July 1865, APEBA/SACP, m. 3454; petition of Silvana Porciúncula de S. José to president, Salvador, 18 Sept. 1866 (with supporting documentation), APEBA/SACP, m. 3674; "O Coronel Joaquim Antonio da Silva Carvalhal," Bahia Ilustrada, 5 May 1867.


76. Petitions of Francisco Antônio de Carvalhal Menezes e Vasconcelos (and supporting documents, including a list of these volunteers), *Amer/BR*, f.14–16.

77. *Bahia Ilustrada*, 1, 10 Nov., 1 Dec. 1867.


79. Commander of arms to president, Recife, 29 July 1867, *Arquivo Público do Estado de Pernambuco*, CA 81, fol. 207. Manfa probably failed to raise this company, for he never claimed to have successfully done so even as he trumpeted his other services. See his petition, f.14–16.

80. Most of Paulo de Queiroz Duarte’s institutional history of the Zuavos is consistent with the personnel records I located. But Duarte was unable to trace the later Zuavo companies, the Fifth through the Eleventh, which embarked from Salvador in late 1865 and early 1866. See Duarte, *Voluntários*, vol. 2, tomo 5, pp. 184–204. The following account differs significantly from that of Eduardo Silva, who incorrectly assumed that the Third Zuavos, in which Galvão served, remained with the Voluntários da Patria battalion with which it had embarked from Salvador, implying (also incorrectly) that Galvão saw combat in May 1866. *Prince*, 26–34.


82. Quoted in Duarte, *Voluntários*, vol. 2, tomo 5, p. 189.


85. Oceano to Angelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz, Buenos Aires, 7 Feb. 1866 (secret), in Oceano, *Cartas*, 125–51. Galvão failed to obtain his request, and on 5 May 1866 he was formally removed from his post on health grounds. *Atestado, Secretaria do Comando das Armas, Salvador, 5 May 1871, Amer/BR, C-175-339.

86. Files on Galliz and Maniva, *ANRJ/FGP*.


89. Cerqueira, *Reminisencias*, 104.


91. Files on Firmino José do Doria, José Soares Cupim Júnior, Militão de Jesus Pires, and Nicolau da Silveira, *ANRJ/FGP*.


94. In addition to the illustrations cited in note 66 above, see Captain Marcolino’s photograph in Varella, *Da Bahia*, 13.


97. *O Alabama*, 28 May, 1 June 1870.


100. Varella, *Da Bahia*, 13, 14–15; Braga, *Sociedade*, 75.


102. See the petitions, dated 31 Mar. 1871, 27 Mar. 1872, and 16 May 1874, in *Amer/BR*, C-17–539. None contain the usual supporting documentation, though army officials repeatedly requested that he provide it. Writing in 1895, Alexandre José de Mello Moraes Filho commented that Obia’s companions in Rio de Janeiro insisted that he had a praiseworthy service record. *Festas e tradições populares do Brasil*, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguet, 1940), 543.

103. Querino, “Homens.”
5. Benjamin Constant

Translated by Hendrik Kraay.

1. The classic military history of the war is Tasso Fragoso, História da guerra, 2d ed. The most recent scholarly study of the war is Doratioto, Malda guerra.

2. Benjamin Constant to [?], n.d. (draft), MCBC/ABC, BC/Doc. Of./C.P. 000.000.00.

3. Lemos, Cartas da guerra.


5. Some of these letters, extracts of which were published by his first biographer, no longer exist in the Benjamin Constant archive. See Raimundo Teixeira Mendes, Benjamin Constant: Esboço de uma apreciação da vida e da obra do Fundador da República Brasileira, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Apostolado Positivista do Brasil, 1894), 284–50.


8. For different perspectives on this issue see Wilma Peres Costa, A espada de Dímodo; and Izecksohn, Cerne da discórdia.


10. Benjamin Constant to Antônio Tibúrcio Ferreira de Sousa, n.d., MCBC/ABC, BC/Magalhães, BC/IPE 867.00.00.


12. Benjamin Constant to Maria Joaquina Botelho de Magalhães, Potrero Pires Camp, 1 Nov. 1866, in Lemos, Cartas da guerra, 57.
