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Copyright 1994 Charleston Newspapers
Charleston Daily
Mail (West Virginia)
July 16, 1994, Saturday
SECTION: Editorial; Pg. P
LENGTH: 772 words
HEADLINE:
JUSTICES RECONSIDER RELIGION MAYBE STATES CAN HELP HANDICAPPED ATTEND
CHURCH SCHOOLS
BYLINE: James Kilpatrick
BODY:
WASHINGTON _ The important thing
about the Supreme Court's
decision in the case of the
Village of Kiryas Joel is that the key
opinions had little to do with the Village of Kiryas
Joel.
The key opinions came from five members of
the court who flashed
an unmistakable signal: Change is
coming _ profound change _ in the
law that has governed
church and state relationships for the past 23
years. A
policy of hostile neutrality is about to yield to a policy
of benevolent accommodation.
High time! A
better day is coming.
In the matter immediately at
hand, the facts are almost
irrelevant. In 1976, a
tightly knit community of fundamentalist
Jews, the
Satmar Hasidim, formed the Village of Kiryas Joel in Orange
County, New York. Like other communities, the village
housed
children who suffered from handicaps _ the deaf,
the mentally
retarded, those with physical, mental or
emotional disorders.
When Congress passed the
Disabilities Education Act, the village
elders obtained
services for the children at an annex to one of their
private schools. This arrangement quietly continued until July 1985,
when the Supreme Court handed down two 5-4 decisions, one
from Grand
Rapids, Mich., the other from New York City.
The decisions had the
effect of banning the very kind
of arrangement the village had
created.
For a while the village sent its handicapped children to a
public school in nearby Monroe, but this proved
unworkable. The
children were ridiculed for their
dress, their language and their
Hasidic culture. To
relieve the situation, the state of New York in
1989
designated the village as its own school district. Kiryas
Joel
promptly created a public school for the
handicapped, and the
children again received
benefits.
The 1989 act promptly was challenged as a
mere sham. Critics
protested that public benefits were
flowing to a school that was not
really public at all.
Lower federal courts agreed that the
arrangement
violated the Establishment Clause, and on June 27 the
Supreme Court affirmed their decision. The special consideration
extended to the village was indeed unconstitutional.
Justice David Souter wrote the court's opinion. He was
joined
by Justices Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony Kennedy concurred only in
the judgment
itself. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas
and Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented.
So much for the Village of Kiryas Joel. On July 2,
New York's
Legislature passed two bills intended to get
around Souter's opinion
. Critics already have dubbed
the effort "Son of Sham." If Gov.
Mario Cuomo signs
them, they too will be challenged.
Now to the real
significance. In their separate and dissenting
opinions, five members of the court made one thing clear: Given an
appropriate case in the future, they are ready to overrule
the
Michigan and New York decisions of 1985. They also
are prepared to
discard the landmark 1971 case of Lemon
vs. Kurtzman.
This would be a clean sweep. The Lemon
case laid down a
three-part formula for determining
when a state law does not violate
the Establishment
Clause. The law must have a secular purpose; it
cannot
advance or inhibit religion; and it must not foster an
excessive entanglement of church and state.
In
her separate opinion of June 27, Justice O'Connor remarked
that the slide away from Lemon "is well under way." She was
unwilling to return to its famous three-prong test. She
was ready to
"reconsider" the New York and Michigan
cases of 1985.
Justice Kennedy was of the same mind.
The 1985 decisions "may
have been erroneous." They were
"unfortunate rulings."
The three outright dissenters,
speaking through Justice Scalia,
have long been
prepared to scrap the three regrettable precedents.
They believe the Lemon rules have been twisted from superficial
neutrality to outright hostility.
They look at the language of the First Amendment, and they see
no plausible risk in Grand Rapids, New York City, or the
Village of
Kiryas Joel that an
"establishment of religion" is about to be
state-created.
This is sound doctrine.
Children who attend religious schools
are entitled to
the same secular public benefits that are available
to
children in public schools.
Justice O'Connor put the
matter succinctly: "The Religion
Clauses prohibit the
government from favoring religion, but they
provide no
warrant for discriminating AGAINST religion."
Amen,
Sister Sandra, amen to that.
LOAD-DATE: January
31, 1995
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